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Safety First? The Role of Emotion in Safety
Product Betrayal Aversion
ANDREW D. GERSHOFF
JONATHAN J. KOEHLER
Consumers often face decisions about whether to purchase products that are
intended to protect them from possible harm. However, safety products rarely
provide perfect protection and sometimes “betray” consumers by causing the very
harm they are intended to prevent. Examples include vaccines that may cause
disease and air bags that may explode with such force that they cause death.
Expanding research on betrayal aversion, this study examines the role of emotions
in consumers’ tendency to choose safety options that provide less overall protection
in order to eliminate a very small probability of harm due to safety product betrayal.
In ﬁve studies we ﬁnd that betrayal aversion is reduced and safer alternatives are
selected when factors that dampen the emotional response to potential betrayals
are introduced or taken into account. These factors include changing the betrayal
from an action to an omission (study 1), introducing positive imagery (study 2),
introducing visual representations of risk (study 3), making the decision for another
rather than oneself (study 4), and intuitive thinking style (study 5).

A

growing number of researchers have stressed the importance of examining the decisions consumers make
to protect their health and well-being (Chandran and Menon
2004; Hoffer and Peterson 1994; Menon, Block, and Ramanathan 2002; Thompson 2005). Many of these decisions
include an emotional element that may inﬂuence—if not
determine—the choices that people make (Drolet and Luce
2004; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Sunstein 2005).
Consider, for example, people who must decide whether
or not to purchase safety products and services that are
intended to protect them from possible harm. Car shoppers
decide whether to pay extra for antilock brakes and air bags
that may help them avoid or survive a crash. Patients decide
whether to seek vaccinations for themselves and their chil-

dren that may protect them from disease. Outdoor enthusiasts consider sunscreens, ﬂotation devices, and spray repellants that may provide protection from skin cancer,
drowning, and unwanted outdoor intruders.
The standard economic analysis holds that people should
purchase these products if the total expected beneﬁts of
owning and using them outweigh their total expected costs.
Such computations are difﬁcult because most safety products do not deliver perfect protection and the risks of failure
are often unknown or task dependent. No one can say exactly how much drivers who purchase antilock brakes decrease their risk of dying in an accident because the extra
protection these brakes provide depends on road conditions,
speed, tires, braking style, and so on.
A standard analysis is further complicated by the paradoxical problem that some safety products may “betray”
consumers by causing the very harm they are supposed to
prevent. Air bags occasionally kill people who experience
survivable car crashes (Meyer and Finney 2005), vaccines
occasionally cause disease (Ellenberg and Chen 1997), and
even bear repellant occasionally attracts bears (Matthews
1999).
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) ﬁrst examined how people
respond to safety product betrayals in a variety of contexts.
In one study, participants were asked to assume that they
were indifferent between two rental apartments, each of
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which was equipped with one of two smoke alarms. Next,
they learned that there were differences between the two
alarms. Some participants were told that in the event of a
nighttime ﬁre due to the usual causes, occupants in the apartment equipped with Alarm One had a 2% chance of dying
while occupants in the apartment equipped with Alarm Two
had only a 1% chance of dying. However, they were also
told that the wiring of Alarm Two was such that it sometimes
causes electrical ﬁres that increase the risk of dying in a
nighttime ﬁre by an additional 0.01%. In other words, Alarm
One was associated with a 2% risk of death and Alarm Two
was associated with a 1% ⫹ 0.01% (betrayal) risk of death.
Most participants in this condition preferred the apartment
equipped with Alarm One even though they were nearly
twice as likely to die with this safety device. Koehler and
Gershoff (2003) explained this result as an aversion to the
risk that the smoke alarm would betray its implicit promise
to protect renters by causing the very harm that it was supposed to guard against. When the 0.01% betrayal risk associated with Alarm Two was replaced by a mathematically
identical nonbetrayal risk, namely, an elevated risk of structural collapse, most people selected the alarm that was associated with the lower overall risk of death (1.01%). This
pattern of choices was observed for a large majority of
participants across a variety of scenarios and dependent measures.
It is not surprising that consumers consider the risk of
betrayal when choosing among safety devices. The mere
possibility of betrayal threatens the social order that enables
us to trust the safety infrastructure of our society, causing
intense visceral reactions and negative emotions toward the
betrayer (Koehler and Gershoff 2003). Unfortunately, these
strong negative emotions toward a potential betrayer may
also lead people to take unwise risks. For instance, one of
the most commonly cited reasons (21%) that people did not
intend to be vaccinated against H1N1 inﬂuenza was an unfounded concern about contracting H1N1 from the vaccine
itself (Blendon et al. 2009).
What are the factors that might reduce safety product
betrayal aversion? The strong association between betrayal
aversion and negative emotions reported in Koehler and
Gershoff (2003) provides a starting point for this investigation. Participants who were confronted with safety product
betrayal reported greater feelings of anger, resentment, anxiety, fear, sadness, and disgust compared to when there was
no safety product betrayal, both after a harm had occurred
(see study 4) and when faced with the risk of a potential
for harm (see study 5). If fear and other negative emotions
caused by a potential betrayal lead to avoiding a safety
product, then betrayal aversion may be reduced or eliminated by introducing factors that dampen the negative emotion consumers feel. Below we review evidence that emotion
plays a critical role in risky decision making in general and
in safety decisions in particular.
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EMOTION AND BETRAYAL
BY SAFETY DEVICES
Research suggests that people rely on two distinct yet interactive “systems” for decision making (Chaiken and Trope
1999; Epstein et al. 1996; Kahneman and Frederick 2002;
Pacini and Epstein 1999; Sloman 1996; van Gelder, de Vries,
and van der Pligt 2009). System 1 is an automatic, nondeliberative system that quickly generates impressions of
available stimuli. It is the experiential or emotional system.
System 2 monitors the quality of System 1 impressions using
a more deliberative judgment process. System 2 is the analytical or rational system.
Research on how people evaluate risky options points to
the importance of System 1 (the emotional system). Studies
show that people commonly make judgments and decisions
under uncertainty based on nonprobabilistic rules (Rottenstreich and Kivetz 2006), visceral urges (Loewenstein 1996),
affective evaluations of stimuli (Baumeister et al. 2007; Finucane et al. 2000; Mellers et al. 1997; Slovic et al. 2005),
and gut feelings (Hsee and Weber 1997; Loewenstein et al.
2001; Slovic and Peters 2006; Weber and Milliman 1997).
Consider, for example, Loewenstein et al.’s (2001) risk-asfeelings hypothesis. It argues that feelings such as worry,
dread, and fear drive decisions in ways that cannot be reconciled with an analytical assessment of the underlying
risks. Identical risks may be treated differently due to differences in feelings about available options or feelings present at the time of evaluation. Thus, watching an anxietyprovoking video prior to purchasing a new car can shift
preferences toward a safer car over one that is sportier and
more luxurious (Raghunathan and Pham 1999).
In light of the demonstrated importance of System 1 on
risky choice, we seek to reduce safety device betrayal aversion by dampening the negative emotions caused by betrayal
risks. In a series of behavioral studies, we pursue this goal
by introducing various factors that are likely to promote a
more cognitive task appraisal.

EMOTIONAL INFLUENCES ON
BETRAYAL AVERSION
The ﬁrst factor that we consider is inspired by research on
the omission and normality biases. The omission bias (sometimes referred to as the “actor effect”; see Zeelenberg, van
der Pligt, and de Vries 2000) is the tendency to react to
harmful actions more strongly than equally harmful omissions
(Baron 2008; Richard, van der Pligt, and de Vries 1996). The
normality bias is the tendency to react to bad outcomes that
arise from abnormal circumstances more strongly than
equally bad outcomes that arise from more ordinary circumstances (Prentice and Koehler 2003). These phenomena
are relevant to betrayal research because the conventional
betrayal risk is both an active and an abnormal risk. That
is, a safety device in the betrayal paradigm has the potential
to behave abnormally and may play an active role in causing
harm. However, safety devices may cause or allow harm in
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other ways. For example, a safety device could fail to function properly and thereby passively allow a harm to occur.
Alternatively, a safety device could function as it should,
but the device may yet be an agent of harm due to failures
elsewhere in the system. Because these alternative failures
do not involve both active and abnormal harms, there may
be less negative emotion stemming from them and so less
aversion to these types of potential failure despite identical
risk of harm. We examine this possibility in study 1.
A second factor is the imagery that accompanies the presentation and description of safety device choice. There is
evidence that affect-rich presentations that stir emotions promote a feeling-based evaluation of objects while affect-poor
presentations promote analytical evaluations. Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) studied the effect of such presentations on
people’s willingness to donate money to help save endangered pandas. They found that when the number of pandas
to be saved was represented with affect-rich pictures of the
animals, people were insensitive to the actual number of
pandas being saved. This result is consistent with a feelingbased approach to the problem. However, when the number
of pandas was represented as affect-poor dots, people made
more analytical evaluations that were sensitive to the number
of pandas. Similarly, in a study on factors that affect how
people view threats associated with crime and car accidents,
Berger (2007) found that presenting information in affectpoor graphical or statistical form increased rational judgments and decreased assessments of the seriousness of the
threats relative to affect-rich anecdotal accounts. We examine whether positive imagery and statistical graphs decrease betrayal aversion and associated negative emotions
toward potential betrayal in studies 2 and 3.
We also examine whether betrayal aversion can be reduced by changing the recipient of the safety device from
oneself to a stranger. This hypothesis ﬁts well with anecdotal
evidence that doctors are less prone to rely on emotional
considerations when they are less emotionally involved with
their patients (Sepkowitz 2004), and with academic studies
that show that people make different choices for others than
they make for themselves (Kray 2000). In his remarkable
paper on the role of visceral factors in decision making,
Loewenstein (1996) suggests that people underestimate the
emotional responses of others, particularly when making
decisions for them. The implication of this observation for
our purposes is that emotion-laden risks, such as betrayal
risks, may receive less weight when the decision maker and
person who must live with the consequences of the decision
are different people. Research supports this position. Faro
and Rottenstreich (2006) and Hsee and Weber (1997) ﬁnd
that the choices that people make for unknown others in
risky situations are more risk neutral than those that they
make for themselves. Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) argue
that this result arises from an “empathy gap” in which people
underestimate the impact of emotional considerations for
strangers, but not for themselves. We test the signiﬁcance
of this self-other factor for betrayal aversion in study 4.
Study 5 examines the role that individual differences in
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thinking style may play in betrayal aversion. Although there
is broad consensus in the psychological community about
the validity of the two-system model of reasoning described
previously (Kahneman 2003, 698), there is variability in the
extent to which people typically rely on each of the systems.
For example, in counterfactual thought, representativeness,
and framing problems, people who favor an experiential
thinking style are more likely to respond in a heuristic rather
than analytical manner (Epstein et al. 1996; Shiloh, Salton,
and Sharabi 2002). Because potential betrayal involves an
emotional reaction, we expect that people who favor a more
analytical style of thought will show less aversion to potential safety product betrayal.
In short, four of the ﬁve studies reported here investigate
the effects of a variety of potentially emotion-dampening
factors on betrayal aversion. The ﬁfth study examines individual differences. We take the reality of betrayal aversion
as a starting point, noting that it has been demonstrated by
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) in numerous scenarios, including air bags, vaccines, smoke and ﬁre alarms, and security guards. Throughout the studies presented here, we
use a focused approach and hold the betrayal scenario constant (using the air bag malfunction scenario from Koehler
and Gershoff, studies 4 and 5), which places a greater premium on internal rather than external validity, in order to
increase our conﬁdence in the interpretation of moderating
effects.

STUDY 1: TYPE OF BETRAYAL
Safety products may be associated with harm in different
ways. First, they may become agents of harm directly, as
when an air bag deploys with such force that it kills a car’s
occupants (CNN 1998). In those cases, the air bag fails to
act as it should and is the agent that actively delivers the
harm. Second, safety products may simply fail to provide
the expected protection and therefore be responsible for the
resultant harm in a more passive manner. Such failures pose
a signiﬁcant public health concern (Reuters 2010). Third,
safety devices may act as they should and yet be agents of
harm due to failure elsewhere in the system. For example,
a defective steering column may move an air bag closer to
a driver, and the air bag may then become a proximate agent
of harm in an accident. Here the safety device is indirectly
responsible for the harm.
The air bag is associated with potential for harm in each
of the three cases above, although the cases differ in how
they violate expectations. Consequently, we hypothesize that
the cases also differ in amount of negative emotions and
correspondent betrayal aversion. The possibility that an air
bag may actively cause death is a clear violation of a consumer’s expectations for the safety device. The possibility
that an air bag may fail likewise violates a consumer’s expectations but does not violate the consumer’s expectation
that the device will not cause harm in an otherwise safe
situation. Based on prior research that ﬁnds people have
stronger emotional responses to harms that arise from actions rather than inactions, we hypothesize less negative
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emotion and less betrayal aversion to a passive safety device
betrayal versus an active betrayal. Furthermore, when a
safety device is the proximate agent of harm but has acted
precisely as it was designed to act (indirect betrayal), there
is a reduced sense in which the device has violated expectations. We therefore hypothesize less aversion to the indirect betrayal than either the active or passive betrayals.

Method
One hundred and twenty individuals were each paid $3.00
for participating in study 1. Participants were recruited from
the general public from a paid participant pool at the University of Michigan. In all conditions participants were offered a choice between two otherwise identical automobiles
equipped with different air bags (Koehler and Gershoff
2003). For one of the cars, participants were told that “scientiﬁc crash tests indicate that there is a 2% chance that
drivers who are in a serious accident [in this car] will be
killed due to the impact of the crash.” This was the higher
overall risk option (2%), and it was not associated with any
risk of safety product betrayal. For the other car, participants
were told that “scientiﬁc crash tests indicate there is a 1%
chance that drivers who are in serious accidents risk death
due to the impact of the crash” and that drivers of this car
faced an additional “one chance in 10,000 (.01%) risk of
death.” This is the lower overall risk option (1.01%).
Three conditions varied the source of the additional
(.01%) risk. In the active betrayal condition the source of
the additional risk of death was described as due to a potential action of the safety device, speciﬁcally, that “trauma
caused by the force of the airbag deployment” could kill
drivers and passengers who would not have been killed had
they selected the other car (Koehler and Gershoff 2003,
study 5). In the passive betrayal condition, the source of
the additional 0.01% risk was described as due to a potential
inaction of the safety device: “the airbag could fail to deploy” allowing some drivers and passengers to be killed
who would not have been killed had they selected the other
car. In the indirect betrayal condition, the source of the
additional 0.01% risk was described as follows: “the engine
block may jam the steering column. This may force the
dashboard forward which may increase the forces of the
deploying airbag. This may kill drivers and passengers who
would not have been killed if their cars had been equipped
with the other airbag.”
Participants provided their preference between the two
cars in each condition on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored with “Deﬁnitely prefer option A” at 1 and “Deﬁnitely
prefer option B” at 7. Next, participants were provided with
a subset of items from the PANAS Negative Affect Scale
(Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988), which was also used
in Koehler and Gershoff (2003). Participants used a 5-point
scale anchored by “Not at all” to “Extremely” to indicate
how strongly they expected to feel various negative emotions (angry, afraid, jittery, sad) if they owned option B (i.e.,
the car with the lower overall risk air bag).

Results
A one-way ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant differences in
relative automobile preference depending on how the air
bag might fail (F(2, 118) p 19.37, p ! .001; see ﬁg. 1).
As predicted, preference for the safer air bag (i.e., the 1.01%
overall risk option) increased as the betrayal associated with
the safer option became less acute. Thus, when the betrayal
was passive rather than active, people had a stronger preference for the safer option (M’s p 4.16 and 2.80, respectively; t(118) p 4.40, p ! .01), and when the betrayal was
indirect rather than passive, people had an even stronger
preference for the safer option (M’s p 4.80 and 4.16, respectively; t(118) p 1.99, p ! .05).
We combined the four negative emotion items into a single measure (a p .92). A one-way ANOVA revealed a
main effect for type of failure (F(2, 118) p 9.18, p ! .001).
Planned comparisons showed that negative emotion for an
active betrayal (M p 2.18) is greater than for a passive
betrayal (M p 1.77; t(118) p 2.23, p ! .05) and negative
emotion for a passive betrayal is greater than for an indirect
failure (M p 1.32; t(118) p 2.17, p ! .05).

Discussion
Prior research showed that betrayal and exploitation of
trust is associated with strong negative emotions and a visceral desire to distance oneself from the offending agent
(Buunk 1982; Davis and Petretic-Jackson 2000; Medvec,
Valley, and Thaler 1999; Robinson and Morrison 2000).
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) found that this visceral desire
induces people to choose safety options that increase the
risk of the very harm they seek protection from. Study 1
extends the betrayal aversion phenomenon by showing that
FIGURE 1
STUDY 1: TYPE OF POTENTIAL BETRAYAL ON PREFERENCE
FOR OVERALL LOWER RISK (1.01%) AIR BAG OPTION
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type of potential betrayal affects the emotional reactions
people have to safety options and that those reactions are
associated with degree of betrayal aversion. People apparently experience less negative emotion when betrayals are
passive (i.e., the safety device fails to protect but does not
actively cause harm) or indirect (i.e., the safety device functions properly but is nevertheless an instrument of harm due
to failure elsewhere in the system), and betrayal aversion is
correspondingly less acute.
These results suggest that betrayal and reactions to betrayal risk are not either-or phenomena. A safety product
may betray consumers in various ways and to varying degrees, and the resultant emotion and aversion will be correspondingly graduated. In the remaining studies, we try to
dampen the negative emotions that may inﬂuence betrayal
aversion by introducing and/or measuring factors that are
external to the nature of the betrayal.

STUDY 2: IMAGERY
The affective components of a risky choice situation may
push consumers in the direction of evaluating available
choice options on emotional System 1 grounds rather than
analytical System 2 grounds (Chartrand, van Baaren, and
Bargh 2006). In one probability assessment study, participants were less likely to collect necessary data and more
likely to jump to conclusions following exposure to anxietyproducing stimuli (Lincoln et al. 2009). Similar ﬁndings
have been reported in behavioral economics studies with
the “ultimatum game” (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Sanfey
et al. 2003). Andrade and Ariely (2009) found that 73% of
people who were made angry prior to playing the ultimatum
game (via a movie clip) rejected inequitable offers, but only
40% of people who were made happy rejected the identical
offer.
The emotional response to betrayal risk may operate similarly. If so, then exposure to positive stimuli may reduce
the negative emotions associated with betrayal risk and
thereby weaken the betrayal aversion effect. We test this
hypothesis in study 2 by exposing participants to images
that are known to inﬂuence emotional states but that are
unrelated to the safety device choice task. We predict that
providing images that reduce people’s negative feelings will
interfere with emotion-based reasoning and increase preference for the lower overall risk safety option. Although
our focus is on identifying factors that reduce betrayal aversion, the same logic suggests that images that increase negative feelings may exacerbate betrayal aversion.

Method
Two hundred and forty-six individuals were recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Although demographics were not collected from this sample, a pretest sample
of 158 participants was 53% female with a mean age of
35.5, ranging from 18 to 63 years old. Each was paid the
equivalent of $10 per hour. The study was a 2 (betrayal:
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yes, no) #3 (imagery: negative, positive, none) betweensubjects design.
All participants read what was said to be an excerpt from
a consumer magazine article. The article described new features in an automobile model, including two air bag options.
The air bag options were described much as they were in
study 1 (e.g., 2% risk vs. 1% ⫹ .01% risk). As in study 1,
the additional risk in the betrayal conditions was described
as due to “trauma caused by the force of the airbag deployment.” The additional risk in the no betrayal conditions
was described as due to “causes other than the direct impact
of the crash.” We expected that participants would behave
rationally and show greater preference for the lower (1.01%)
risk air bag when there was no possibility that it would be
the cause of harm, regardless of images presented with the
choice.
An ad for a photo contest that would appear in the next
issue of the magazine appeared at the bottom of the page.
In the positive and negative image conditions, this advertisement included six images. Images were selected from
the International Affective Picture System, a set of images
prescreened to produce speciﬁc premeasured emotional reactions (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 2005). The positive
images included a child eating watermelon, a deer drinking
from a lake, a cow in a ﬁeld, a family in a living room, a
church on a hill, and a butterﬂy on a ﬂower. The negative
images included a dog baring its teeth, an armed robbery,
a sinking ship, a tornado, and an attacking snake. In the no
image control condition, no photos were displayed.
Participants read the excerpt and answered a question
about it to ensure task attention. Next, those in the positive
and negative image conditions used 5-point scales to rate
the images on four positive (joyful, safe, relieved, relaxed)
and four negative (afraid, angry, sad, jittery) emotions.
Then, on a separate page, participants used a 7-point scale
to indicate their air bag preference. Finally, participants estimated the amount of negative emotion (afraid, angry, sad,
jittery) they would feel if they owned the car that had the
lower overall risk (1.01%) air bag.

Results
Manipulation Check. We combined participants’ ratings of the four positive emotions (a p .95) and four negative emotions (a p .93) toward the images to create one
positive and one negative emotional measure. An ANOVA
revealed a main effect for imagery on the positive emotion
measure, with images in the positive conditions rated more
positively (M p 3.34) than images in the negative conditions (M p 1.13; F(1, 149) p 332.46, p ! .001). Imagery
ratings did not differ by betrayal condition, and there was
no betrayal # imagery interaction (all p’s 1 .10). Likewise
an ANOVA revealed a main effect for imagery on the negative emotion measure with images in the negative conditions rated more negatively (M p 2.87) than images in the
positive conditions (M p 1.12; F(1, 149) p 175.12, p !
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.001). Again, there was no main effect or interaction involving betrayal (all p’s 1 .10).

Air Bag Preference. Figure 2 presents the mean preference ratings for the air bag alternatives. An ANOVA revealed a main effect for potential betrayal, with greater preference for the lower overall risk air bag in the no betrayal
condition (M p 5.45) than in the betrayal condition (M p
2.98; F(1, 240) p 154.14, p ! .001). There was also a
signiﬁcant betrayal # imagery interaction (F(2, 240 p
5.36, p ! .005). Follow-up contrasts showed that preference
for the safer air bag differed in the betrayal conditions (F(2,
117) p 7.62, p ! .01) but not in the no betrayal conditions
(F(2, 123) p 0.08, p 1 .10). In the betrayal conditions,
preference for the safer option was higher when positive
imagery was present (M p 3.84) than when no imagery
was present (M p 2.59; F(1, 85) p 12.00, p ! .001). The
presence of negative imagery in the betrayal conditions (M
p 2.58) did not affect preference for the safer alternative
relative to no imagery (F(1, 88) p 0.17, p 1 .10).
Emotional Reaction to Potential Betrayal. An
ANOVA revealed a main effect for betrayal on the aggregated emotion measure (a p .90) with greater negative
emotions reported for air bags that have a potential to betray
(M p 1.77) compared to those that do not betray (M p
1.25; F(1, 240) p 33.46, p ! .01). Further, there was a
signiﬁcant betrayal # imagery interaction (F(2, 240) p
5.94, p ! .01). When there was potential for betrayal, participants in the positive imagery condition experienced less
negative emotion (M p 1.31) than participants in either the
negative imagery or control conditions (M’s p 2.02 and
1.96, respectively; F(2, 117) p 8.104, p ! .001). When
there was no potential for betrayal, there was no difference
in reported emotion across the three imagery conditions
(F(2, 123) p 0.47, p 1 .10).

Discussion
Study 2 is notable for two reasons. First, it replicated the
basic betrayal aversion effect. Participants strongly preferred
a higher risk option (2% chance of death) when the lower
risk option (1.01% chance of death) included a small risk
of betrayal. However, when the small risk of betrayal was
replaced by a mathematically identical nonbetrayal risk, this
choice pattern reversed. Participants showed greater preference for the normatively lower risk (1.01% chance of
death) option. Second, study 2 showed that exposure to
positive imagery decreased negative emotion and decreased
aversion to the low risk safety option that had a potential
to betray. This result is consistent with prior research that
showed an inﬂuence of emotional stimuli on decisions involving safety and risk (Andrade and Ariely 2009; Hsee and
Rottenstreich 2004; Lincoln et al. 2009; Raghunathan and
Pham 1999).
Negative imagery did not increase aversion to the betrayal
option or negative emotional responses to it. The result may
be due to a ceiling effect: betrayal aversion is already so

FIGURE 2
STUDY 2: IMAGES AND POTENTIAL BETRAYAL ON
PREFERENCE FOR OVERALL LOWER RISK
(1.01%) AIR BAG OPTION

prevalent that introduction of negative imagery does little
more than reinforce the evaluation of the alternatives that
would be observed without it. Alternatively, the speciﬁc
negative images used in this study may have been too weak
to arouse strong negative emotions and therefore did not
increase betrayal aversion. Regardless of which explanation
is true, the observation that positive images can affect both
consumers’ emotions and safety choice behavior supports
our thesis that a key to overcoming betrayal aversion lies
in dampening the negative emotion that betrayal evokes.

STUDY 3: CUES TO RATIONAL
PROCESSING
In study 3, we explore a related technique for dampening
betrayal emotion and betrayal aversion. Drawing on research
that shows that irrational judgments can be curtailed when
relevant data are presented with graphical support (Berger
2007; Bhasker and Kumaraswamy 1990; Kleinmuntz and
Schkade 1993; Liersch and McKenzie 2009), we consider
whether describing safety risks with the aid of graphics will
reduce emotional reactions to potential betrayal and encourage consumers to select the safer option. Using the air
bag scenario, we predict that providing a graphical display
of the risks associated with each of the potential air bags
will reduce emotional reactions and reduce betrayal aversion.

Method
Two hundred and sixty-three individuals were recruited
from the University of Michigan paid participant pool, as
in study 1, and each was paid $2. The study used a 2 (betrayal: yes, no) # 2 (risk presentation: narrative, visual)
between-subjects design. The basic stimuli and dependent
measures were similar to those in study 2. Participants in
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the visual risk presentation conditions received an image
graphic that described the number of deaths expected out
of 10,000 for each of the air bags. There was a box above
the description of each air bag titled “Total deaths expected
in 10,000 serious accidents.” The option associated with the
2% risk contained an array of 200 tiny icons of skulls with
crossbones. The option associated with the 1.01% risk contained an array of 101 skull and crossbones icons.
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FIGURE 3
STUDY 3: RISK PRESENTATION AND POTENTIAL BETRAYAL
ON PREFERENCE FOR OVERALL LOWER RISK (1.01%)
AIR BAG OPTION

Results
Figure 3 presents mean preference ratings for the alternatives. Replicating study 1 and Koehler and Gershoff (2003),
there was a main effect for betrayal: participants showed
greater preference for the safer option when the additional
risk did not involve betrayal (M p 5.10) versus when it
involved betrayal (M p 2.96; F(1, 259) p 117.72, p !
.001).
There was also a betrayal # risk presentation interaction
(F(1, 259) p 4.49, p ! .05). Follow-up contrasts showed
that preference for the safer air bag differed in the betrayal
conditions as a function of risk presentation (t(129) p 3.24,
p ! .01). In the betrayal condition preference for the safer
option increased when the presentation included a visual
representation of the risks (M p 3.47) versus when it was
presented solely in narrative form (M p 2.54). In the no
betrayal conditions presentation format did not affect preference (t(130) p 0.45, p 1 .10).
An ANOVA revealed a main effect for betrayal on the
aggregated emotion measure (a p .91) with greater negative
emotion in the betrayal condition (M p 2.13) than in the
no betrayal condition (M p 1.41; F(1, 259) p 29.67, p !
.001). There was also a signiﬁcant betrayal # risk representation interaction (F(1, 259) p 7.86, p ! .01). When
there was potential for betrayal, participants in the visual
risk representation condition reported less negative emotion
(M p 1.86) than participants in the narrative risk representation condition (M p 2.36; F(1, 129) p 7.73, p ! .01).
When there was no potential for betrayal, there was no
difference in emotional reactions as a function of risk representation F(1, 130) p 0.83, p 1 .10).

Discussion
Study 3 provides further support for the idea that factors
that dampen a decision maker’s negative emotions can reduce betrayal aversion. The data showed that presenting the
statistical information associated with a betrayal risk in a
graphical format leads to a more cognitive and a less emotion-based evaluation of the available options. We observed
a reduction in both negative emotion and betrayal aversion
when we supplemented a risk narrative with a vivid graphical display of the corresponding risks.

STUDY 4: SAFETY DEVICE RECIPIENT
People who give good advice often have trouble following
that same advice in their own lives. Research shows that

people of all ages rely on different attributes, and make
different choices, depending on whether they are advising
(or choosing for) someone else or making a decision that
affects themselves (Hsee and Weber 1997; Kray and Gonzalez 1999; Prencipe and Zelazo 2005). Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) ﬁnd that the choices people make for others
are more risk neutral than those they make for themselves,
a phenomenon they refer to as an “empathy gap.” If an
empathy gap is common in risky choice tasks, then safety
product betrayal aversion might be reduced by asking decision makers to imagine that they are making safety product
choices for strangers. We anticipate that this technique will
dampen the negative emotions ordinarily experienced by
those who contemplate betrayal options and increase preference for the lower overall risk safety option.

Method
Ninety-two individuals were recruited from the University
of Michigan paid participant pool, and each was paid $3.
The study used a 2 (betrayal: yes, no) # 2 (safety device
recipient: self, other) between-subjects design. The basic
stimuli and dependent measures were similar to those used
in studies 2 and 3. The self-safety-device-recipient conditions were identical to the control conditions in studies 2
and 3, with participants evaluating the alternatives as if they
were making a choice for themselves. In the other-safetydevice-recipient conditions, participants were told that they
had to choose one of the options for another (unnamed)
person in the study.

Results
Figure 4 presents mean preference ratings for the alternatives. There was a main effect for betrayal condition (F(1,
88) p 15.19, p ! .001). Participants showed greater pref-
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FIGURE 4
STUDY 4: SAFETY DEVICE RECIPIENT AND POTENTIAL
BETRAYAL ON PREFERENCE FOR OVERALL LOWER RISK
(1.01%) AIR BAG OPTION

System 2 reasoning than were the more emotive self-recipient participants.
This result implies that policy makers may be able to
minimize interference from the negative emotions that betrayal options cause by relying on scenarios that call to mind
the safety of strangers rather than the safety of oneself or
a loved one. This implication challenges the intuitive notion
that risk management professionals should recommend the
same options to their clients and patients that they would
recommend to a close family member or themselves.

STUDY 5: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
IN THINKING STYLE
Study 5 extends our examination of the role of emotion in
betrayal aversion by considering the role of individual differences in reasoning style on safety product choices. Research shows that some people rely more on experiential or
intuitive ways of thought (System 1) and others rely more
on analytical or rational approaches (System 2; Epstein et
al. 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999). Because those who tend
toward the experiential-intuitive mode are more likely to
invoke emotional and heuristic ways of thought (Epstein et
al. 1996; Shiloh et al. 2002), we expect that experiential
thinkers will react more strongly to potential betrayals and
be more likely to avoid them.
We operationalize experiential thought tendencies via
scores on a version of the Faith in Intuition (FI) component
of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al. 1996).
The FI scale measures the extent to which people rely on
feelings and intuitions to make judgments and decisions. We
predict greater betrayal aversion among those who tend toward experiential-intuitive thinking. However, we do not
expect experiential thinkers to make different safety choices
than analytical thinkers when the betrayal element is removed from the decision task.

erence for the safer option (1.01% chance of death) when
the additional risk did not involve betrayal (M p 5.20)
compared to when it did (M p 4.11). There was also a
signiﬁcant betrayal # safety device recipient interaction
(F(1, 88) p 4.30, p ! .05). In the self-safety-device-recipient
condition, there was a signiﬁcant decrease in preference for
the safer alternative in the self-choice condition when it had
the potential to betray (M p 3.38) than when it did not (M
p 5.17; t(88) p 4.07, p ! .001). In the other-safety-devicerecipient conditions, we did not detect a signiﬁcant decrease
in preference for the safer alternative as a function of
whether it did or did not have the potential to betray (M’s
p 4.69 and 5.24, respectively; t(88) p 1.26, p 1 .10).
Regarding the emotion measure, an ANOVA detected a
main effect wherein participants showed greater negative
emotion in the betrayal condition (M p 1.73) than in the
no betrayal condition (M p 1.37; F(1, 88) p 14.67, p !
.001). We also detected a signiﬁcant betrayal # safety device recipient interaction that showed that choosing for another person rather than oneself reduced the difference in
emotion in the betrayal and nonbetrayal conditions (F(1, 88)
p 14.17, p ! .001). In the self-recipient conditions, there
was greater negative emotion in the betrayal condition (M
p 2.04) compared to the nonbetrayal condition (M p 1.31;
t(88) p 2.74, p ! .01). But in the other-recipient conditions,
there was no difference in negative emotion as a function
of betrayal (M’s p 1.42; F(1, 88) p 0.01, p 1 .10).

One hundred and thirteen people from the University of
Michigan student participant pool participated in study 5.
Each participant received extra course credit. Participants
completed the ﬁve-item Faith in Intuition Scale (FI). This
scale asks participants to indicate their degree of agreement
with statements like “I trust my initial feelings about people”
and “I believe in trusting my hunches.” After a ﬁller task,
participants were randomly assigned to the betrayal or no
betrayal conditions of the air bag scenario and responded
to the usual dependent measures.

Discussion

Results

Participants in study 4 were less likely to be betrayal
averse when choosing the safety product for a stranger rather
than themselves. The reduction in negative emotions reported by other-recipient participants versus the self-recipient participants is also consistent with a conclusion that
other-recipient participants were more inclined to rely on

As before, there was a main effect for betrayal: participants showed greater preference for the safer option when
the additional risk did not involve betrayal (M p 5.30)
versus when it did (M p 4.05; F(1, 111) p 22.00, p !
.001). Participants also indicated more negative emotion toward the lower risk alternative in the betrayal condition (M

Method
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p 1.72) than in the nonbetrayal condition (M p 1.22; F(1,
111) p 21.29, p ! .001). The ﬁve FI items were averaged
to create a single FI score (a p .82). We included this
measure in a regression along with an indicator variable for
betrayal condition and a betrayal # FI interaction term. In
addition to the main effect for betrayal described above, the
regression revealed a main effect for FI such that higher FI
scores were associated with greater preference for the safer
air bag option (t(1, 109) p ⫺3.48, p ! .001). There was
also a betrayal # FI interaction (t(1, 109) p ⫺2.49, p !
.05; see ﬁg. 5). In the betrayal condition, higher FI scores
were associated with preference for the higher risk air bag
option (standardized beta p ⫺0.49; t(1, 54) p ⫺4.16; p
! .001). In the no betrayal condition, there was no effect of
FI on air bag preference (standardized beta p ⫺0.09; t(1,
55) p ⫺0.73; p 1 .10).
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FIGURE 5
STUDY 5: ESTIMATED REGRESSION LINES OF FAITH IN
INTUITION ON PREFERENCE FOR OVERALL LOWER RISK
(1.01%) AIR BAG OPTION IN BETRAYAL AND
NO-BETRAYAL CONDITIONS

Discussion
We have argued throughout that betrayal aversion is
linked to the negative emotional response people experience
upon learning that an object of protection may become a
source of harm. If this is true, then we would expect people
who rely more on their experiential system to react more
negatively to a potential product betrayal. Study 5 found
this to be the case: those with higher Faith in Intuition (FI)
scores were more betrayal averse. However when the betrayal risk was replaced by an equivalent nonbetrayal risk,
the FI score did not predict safety preferences.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
When a safety product violates consumers’ trust by causing
the harm it is intended to prevent, people feel betrayed. In
earlier research Koehler and Gershoff (2003) showed that
the mere possibility of safety product betrayal conjures up
strong emotional reactions and some surprising avoidance
behavior identiﬁed as betrayal aversion, namely, a preference for higher overall risk safety products compared to
lower-risk products that include a small chance of betrayal.
The present article extends this research by examining the
role that negative emotion plays in the production of betrayal-averse choices. We conducted a series of controlled
laboratory experiments in which we dampened and/or measured negative emotion in a safety device betrayal decision
task. These experiments consistently demonstrate that betrayal aversion is reduced when factors that dampen the
emotional response to potential betrayals are introduced or
taken into account. These factors include changing the betrayal from an action to an omission (study 1), introducing
positive imagery (study 2), introducing visual representations of risk (study 3), making the decision for another rather
than oneself (study 4), and intuitive thinking style (study
5).
Our research has implications for social policy makers
and health professionals. Various government agencies are
charged with protecting public safety and general welfare.
These agencies frequently issue safety standards on such im-

portant matters as seat belt usage in cars, helmet usage on
bicycles, and vaccinations for public school children (Fischhoff 1984). Policy makers, who generally prefer alternatives
that maximize overall safety, need to be sensitive to the
possibility that members of the public will ﬁnd some of
those alternatives emotionally repugnant. Indeed, large portions of the public may act in ways that put them at increased
risk. Consider the 2009 worldwide outbreak of the H1N1
inﬂuenza virus. Although prestigious health agencies like
the Centers for Disease Control consistently recommended
vaccinating all children for this virus, polls showed that only
40% of American parents felt that H1N1 vaccination was
in their children’s best interests (Healy 2009). Approximately half of the parents who did not plan to vaccinate
their children expressed concern about betrayal-related effects, namely, the possibility that the vaccine itself could
cause illness. Our studies suggest that one way to align the
views of the general public with the recommendations of
public policy makers is to minimize the impact of negative
emotions and emotional reasoning on consumers. For example, the expected death toll of children that do and do
not vaccinate could be represented in graphical form on
billboards and other public health advertisements.
Similarly, health professionals who provide treatment
plans for patients that include a risk of betrayal could be
taught to resist the invitation and urge to offer opinions about
how they would make the decision if they themselves were
the patient. Our research suggests that this may be the wrong
strategy for encouraging patients to attend to overall risks.
Instead, health professionals might be advised to retain their
neutrality and offer the same recommendations to their patients that they would offer to a stranger. Although such a
strategy may seem strange and antithetical to a personal
health care system, strangeness may be a small price to pay
for a decision strategy that increases the probability of a
favorable outcome.
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Of course, any strategic framing of information raises
ethical and normative issues (Slovic et al. 2005). On the
one hand, because all information must be framed in some
way or other, one could argue that it is too costly—or even
unethical—not to frame health and safety information in
ways that beneﬁt the general public (cf. Thaler and Sunstein
2008). Advocates of this view treat betrayal aversion as a
judgment error that should be corrected (Sunstein 2005),
perhaps via some of the techniques described herein. We
accept the cost/ethics argument above but are not persuaded
by the normative claim (Koehler and Gershoff 2005). It is
one thing to present safety information and options in ways
that are likely to maximize societal beneﬁts or minimize
overall harms. It is quite another to suggest that a consumer’s
safety product preferences (holding costs aside) should depend entirely upon a comparison of the overall risks of the
focal harm posed by the available options. If the negative
consequences of safety product betrayals reach beyond the
immediate harm (e.g., by instilling within the general public
a deep mistrust of manufacturers and government safety
agencies), then one cannot say that consumers’ safety product preferences should rely on probability of death comparisons alone. A rational person may justly believe that
eliminating the collateral damage that betrayals may cause,
including the emotional toll and damage to the social order,
is worth trading for a small increased risk of death.
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